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Abstract
We study the problem of finding the profit-maximizing mechanism for a monopolistic
provider of a single, non-excludable public good. This problem has been well studied for the
case when agents’ types are independently distributed, but the literature is almost silent about
the case of general joint distributions. We investigate the problem from an automated mech-
anism design perspective, meaning that we want to understand the algorithmic complexity
of finding the optimal mechanism when we are given a finite set of type profiles and their
distribution.
We show that the optimal deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post
individual rational mechanism can be computed in polynomial time by reducing the problem
to finding a maximal weight closure in a directed graph. Node weights in the graph correspond
to conditional virtual values. When valuations are independently distributed, the constructed
mechanism is also optimal among all Bayes-Nash implementable and ex-interim individual ra-
tional mechanisms. In contrast, for dependent valuations strictly higher profit can be achieved
if one allows for ex-interim individual rationality. By invoking techniques due to Cre´mer and
McLean, we show that optimal deterministic, ex-interim individual rational, Bayes-Nash im-
plementable or dominant strategy implementable mechanisms still can be found in polynomial
time if the joint distribution of types satisfies certain regularity conditions.
JEL Codes: C61, C72, D82, H41
1 Introduction
We study the problem of finding a mechanism that maximizes the expected profit of a monopo-
listic seller of a single, non-excludable public good. This problem was first solved by Gu¨th and
Hellwig [1986] for the case of Bayesian-Nash implementation when valuations are independently
distributed with monotone hazard rate. Our goal is to study the problem for general distributions
of valuations, for dominant strategy and Bayes-Nash implementation, and for ex-post as well as
∗Corresponding author
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interim individual rationality. It is too much to hope for closed form solutions in each case. In-
stead, the mechanism design problem is modeled as a combinatorial optimization problem, more
precisely, as an integer linear program (ILP). The ILP has as set of feasible solutions the set of all
mechanisms satisfying particular incentive and individual rationality constraints, and as objective
the expected profit. The parameters of the constraints and the objective are determined by the set
of possible type profiles and their distribution. One of the challenges is to represent the expected
profit as a linear function in the decision variables, the other is to provide, if possible, an efficient
algorithm to solve the integer linear program. We are interested in polynomial time algorithms
in the number of agents and the number of type profiles of the agents. We are also interested in
gaining insights in economic properties of optimal mechanisms, and classes of instances where a
“simple” mechanism is optimal.
Our main result is that the profit maximizing, ex-post individual rational, dominant strategy
incentive compatible mechanism can be computed in polynomial time. This holds for any number
of agents, which is in sharp contrast to a recent result in Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2011] on
profit-maximizing single-item auctions for general distributions of valuations. Papadimitriou and
Pierrakos [2011] reduce the optimal auction problem to finding the maximum weight independent
set on a k−partite graph, where k is the number of bidders. This yields a polynomial time al-
gorithm for the two bidder case. They further show that the problem is NP-hard for more than
two bidders. We show that finding a profit-maximizing mechanism for the non-excludable public
good problem for general distributions can be modeled as an integer linear program with a totally
unimodular matrix. More specifically, the ILP is equivalent to a maximal closure problem on
partially ordered sets, where weights of the elements are equal to conditional virtual values. Con-
trary to single-item auctions, this yields a polynomial-time algorithm for any number of agents.
Notably, the optimal mechanism might choose to provide the public good for type realizations
where the sum of conditional virtual values is strictly smaller than the cost of providing the good.
For the case of independent valuations with monotone hazard rate, we get the optimal Bayes-Nash
allocation rule of Gu¨th and Hellwig [1986] as a byproduct.
For general independent type distributions, we illustrate, using recent results by Gershkov
et al. [2012], that allowing for interim individual rationality instead of only for ex-post individual
rationality or Bayes-Nash implementation instead of only dominant strategy implementation can-
not increase the expected profit. However, by virtue of an example it is shown that for correlated
valuations Bayes-Nash implementation may yield more profit than dominant strategy implemen-
tation. Transferring techniques developed for auctions by Cre´mer and McLean [1988] to the public
good case, we illustrate that under some mild assumptions the profit maximizing interim individ-
ual rational dominant strategy implementable mechanism can be determined in polynomial time.
Furthermore as for auctions, it yields full surplus extraction. The same holds for Bayes-Nash
implementation. By virtue of an example it is shown that full surplus extraction breaks down
if we require ex-post individual rationality. It remains an open problem whether finding the op-
timal Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, ex-post individual rational mechanism can be efficiently
computed, and how to compute efficiently the optimal Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, interim
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individual rational mechanism for general correlated valuations.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We are given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} who hold private information ti ∈ Ti ⊆ R about their
values for consumption of a non-excludable public good. We denote the set of type tuples of all
agents by T := T1×. . .×Tn. All sets Ti are assumed to be finite. Type tuples t ∈ T occur according
to the joint probability distribution ϕ and the cumulative distribution Φ. Furthermore, let ϕti be
the probability that ti occurs and Φti the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
The set of possible outcomes is A := {0, 1}, where 1 denotes the event of providing the
public good, while 0 means not providing it. Agents assess outcomes through valuation functions
vi := A × Ti → R for all i ∈ N . In case of the non-excludable public good problem valuation
functions take the form of vi(1, ti) = ti and vi(0, ti) = 0. Agents act via a direct mechanism (f, p),
which consists of an allocation rule f : T → A and a payment scheme p : T → Rn as we allow for
transfers. Agents are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities implying that for type ti and reports
(si, t−i) ∈ T the utility of agent i is vi(f(ti, t−i), ti)− pi(si, t−i).
The provision of the public good costs C. The profit pi(t) of the designer for a reported type
tuple t is the sum of payments collected minus the cost incurred:
pi(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi(t)− f(t)C.
We are seeking for mechanisms (f, p) that maximize the expected profit
∑
t ϕtpi(t). First, we
search for the optimal mechanism among those that are implementable in dominant-strategies
and ex-post individually rational. Then we discuss other solution concepts. By the revelation
principle we may restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms.
Definition 2.1 A mechanism (f, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if for
all agents i, for all fixed t−i and for all si 6= ti
vi(f(ti, t−i), ti)− pi(ti, t−i) ≥ vi(f(si, t−i), ti)− pi(si, t−i).
Definition 2.2 A mechanism (f, p) is ex-post individual rational if and only if for all agents i
and for all t ∈ T
vi(f(ti, t−i), ti)− pi(ti, t−i) ≥ 0.
Let xt ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ T be decision variables that represent the allocation function f , i.e.,
xt = 1⇔ f(t) = 1. Let us also introduce decision variables for each payment, i.e., for all i and t
we have that pit = pi(t). Our mechanism design problem can then be formulated as the following
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integer linear program.
max
∑
t∈T
ϕt
(∑
i
pit − xtC
)
(P1)
subject to
tixti,t−i − piti,t−i ≥ tixsi,t−i − pisi,t−i ∀i ∈ N, ∀t−i ∈ T−i, ∀si, ti ∈ Ti, (DS)
tixt − pit ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T, (IR)
xt ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T (BI)
Constraints (DS) ensure implementability in dominant strategies, while (IR) constraints are re-
sponsible for ex-post individual rationality. As we go for deterministic mechanisms we also require
the allocation variables to be binary (BI).
We refer to an allocation given by xti,t−i as monotone allocation if and only if for all i and t−i,
x is increasing in ti, i.e., for all si, ti if si > ti, then xsi,t−i ≥ xti,t−i . It is a well-know result (see,
e.g. Nisan et al. [2007]) that monotonicity in such single-parameter domains is necessary and
sufficient for implementability in dominant strategies. Monotonicity implies that the allocation
for each player given the others’ types is a step-function that is based on critical values equal to
the minimum type for which we allocate.
Proposition 2.3 Let x be monotone. The maximal payments that can be charged in any domi-
nant strategy and ex-post individual rational mechanism are given by:
piti,t−i =
inf{si ∈ Ti|xsi,t−i = 1} if xti,t−i = 1,0 if xti,t−i = 0. (1)
This is a general result for single-parameter domains (see, for example, Nisan et al. [2007]). For the
sake of completeness we include a proof in the appendix. Recall that our objective is to maximize
the expected total profit, which is the total payment collected minus the cost of allocating the
public good. Observe that in this case the payments should be maximal, hence, without loss of
generality, we can specify the payment scheme for a profit maximizing implementable allocation
x as in (1).
Let us define the operator  for vectors as follows: for every s, t ∈ T we write s  t if and
only if si ≥ ti for all i ∈ N and s 6= t. Note that  induces a partial order on T .
Proposition 2.4 Let f be an allocation function and let {xt}t∈T be the variables induced by f .
Then f is monotone if and only if for all s, t ∈ T such that s  t it holds that xs ≥ xt.
Proposition 2.4 can be regarded as a special case of the PAD property (positive association of
differences) that is implied by monotonicity (see Roberts [1979]). A simple proof can be found in
the appendix. A set S ⊆ T is called upper comprehensive if for all s ∈ S, t ∈ T , we have that
t  s implies t ∈ S.
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Corollary 2.5 An allocation function in the non-excludable public good setting is implementable
if and only if the type tuples, for which we allocate the public good, form an upper comprehensive
set on the partially ordered type space (T,).
3 Finding the optimal mechanism
In this section we provide an efficient algorithm to solve the integer linear program given by
(P1),(DS), (IR), and (BI). First, we show how to eliminate variables pit, second, we apply Corollary
2.5 to derive an integer linear program that can be solved in polynomial time. We conclude this
section by discussing the special case of independent type distributions and relating our results
to the results by Gu¨th and Hellwig [1986].
3.1 Linearization of the objective function
Notice that the objective function is not linear in xt, if we substitute variables p as given in (1).
In order to get a linear expression in x we first reformulate the revenue part of the objective as∑
t
ϕt
∑
i
pit =
∑
i
∑
t
ϕtp
i
t
=
∑
i
∑
t−i
∑
ti
ϕti,t−ip
i
ti,t−i . (2)
Due to monotonicity, whenever for a fixed t−i there is some ti such that xti,t−i = 1, then for all
si ≥ ti we have that xsi,t−i = 1, hence for that fixed t−i the sum of payments from agent i is∑
ti
ϕti,t−ip
i
ti,t−i = t
∗
i
∑
si≥t∗i
ϕsi,t−i , (3)
where t∗i = inf{si|f(si, t−i) = 1}.
For economy of notation let us introduce t+i := inf{si ∈ Ti|si > ti}, where for the maximal type
of agent i, we interpret t+i as a dummy type that takes value zero and occurs with probability
zero. Building on the monotonicity property of the allocation function we can construct a series
of coefficients for the induced variables such that the sum of the weighted variables results in the
same revenue as in (3):
∑
ti
xti,t−i
ti ∑
si≥ti
ϕsi,t−i − t+i
∑
si≥t+i
ϕsi,t−i
 = t∗i ∑
si≥t∗i
ϕsi,t−i .
5
Note that if for a fixed t−i there is no ti such that xti,t−i = 1, then the coefficients remain valid
as all of the corresponding xti,t−i variables are equal to zero. Therefore, (3) can be rewritten as
∑
ti
ϕti,t−ip
i
ti,t−i =
∑
ti
xti,t−i
ti ∑
si≥ti
ϕsi,t−i − t+i
∑
si≥t+i
ϕsi,t−i

=
∑
ti
xti,t−i
tiϕti,t−i − (t+i − ti) ∑
si≥t+i
ϕsi,t−i
 .
The coefficient of each xti,t−i can be interpreted as the added revenue from agent i if we allocate
the public good at reported type tuple (ti, t−i), versus only at (t+i , t−i). Plugging this into (2)
results in
∑
t
ϕt
∑
i
pit =
∑
i
∑
t−i
∑
ti
xti,t−i
tiϕti,t−i − (t+i − ti) ∑
si≥t+i
ϕsi,t−i

=
∑
t
xt
∑
i
tiϕt − (t+i − ti) ∑
si≥t+i
ϕsi,t−i
 .
From now on we assume that ϕt > 0 for all t. This assumption facilitates an economic
interpretation of the coefficients without making the notation too messy. All results with respect
to the algorithmic complexity of our problem hold without this assumption. With the assumption
we can further transform as follows.
∑
t
ϕt
∑
i
pit =
∑
t
ϕtxt
∑
i
(
ti − (t+i − ti)
∑
si≥t+i ϕsi,t−i
ϕt
)
=
∑
t
ϕtxt
∑
i
(
ti − (t+i − ti)
∑
ri
ϕri,t−i
∑
si≥t+i ϕsi|t−i
ϕt
)
=
∑
t
ϕtxt
∑
i
(
ti − (t+i − ti)
(
1− Φti|t−i
ϕti|t−i
))
,
where ϕti|t−i is the conditional probability that si occurs assuming that the others have t−i and
Φti|t−i is the corresponding conditional cumulative distribution function.
The objective function of (P1) can then be expressed as
∑
t
ϕt
(∑
i
pit − xtC
)
=
∑
t
xtϕt
(∑
i
(
ti − (t+i − ti)
(
1− Φti|t−i
ϕti|t−i
))
− C
)
.
Let
µti|t−i = ti − (t+i − ti)
(
1− Φti|t−i
ϕti|t−i
)
.
We call µti|t−i the conditional virtual valuation of agent i with type ti when the rest of the agents
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have type t−i. In case of independent type distributions this notion coincides with the virtual
valuation introduced by Myerson [1981]. Notice that if we interpret µti|t−i as interdependent
valuations of the agents then the objective function
∑
t
xtϕt
(∑
i
µti|t−i − C
)
can be regarded as expected welfare-maximization with respect to conditional virtual values.
However, from what follows it can be seen that the profit maximizing mechanism will not nec-
essarily take the decision that maximizes virtual welfare for each realization t of types. In other
words, the profit-maximizing mechanism might set xt = 1 even if its coefficient in the objective
is negative.
3.2 Polynomial time algorithms
As the objective function has become linear, by introducing
bt = ϕt
(∑
i
µti|t−i − C
)
we can reformulate our initial model (P1) to the following integer linear program to find the
expected profit maximizing public good mechanism. Thereby, we make also use of Corollary 2.5.
max
∑
t
btxt (P2)
subject to
xs − xt ≥ 0 ∀s, t ∈ T s.t. s  t,
xt ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T
Notice that if bt ≥ 0 for some t implies that bs ≥ 0 for all s  t, then the solution is trivial: set
xt = 1 if and only if bt ≥ 0. In the general case, the following observation provides us with a
polynomial time algorithm.
Proposition 3.1 The incentive compatibility constraints of program (P2) form a totally unimod-
ular matrix.
Proof The coefficient matrix of the incentive compatibility constraints can be seen as the node-
arc incidence matrix of the redirected comparability graph of the partially ordered set T . The
vertices are the type vectors and the mapping of the variables to the type vectors is surjective.
There is a directed arc between each comparable vector directed from the larger vector to the
smaller one. In the node-arc incidence matrix for each arc the start node is indicated by 1,
whilst the end node is indicated by −1, just like in the coefficient matrix of the constraints. The
incidence matrix of any directed graph is totally unimodular (Schrijver [2003]).
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Corollary 3.2 The linear program relaxation of (P2) yields an integer optimal solution, hence
the problem can be solved in time polynomial in |N | and |T |.
We can view (P2) also as a maximal closure problem, which is defined by Picard [1976] as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Maximal closure problem) Given a directed graph G = (V,A) where V is
the set of nodes and A the set of arcs, a closure of G is defined as a subset of vertices Y such that
if a vertex belongs to Y then all its successors belong also to Y . If each vertex vi is associated
with a real number ci, then a maximal closure Y
∗ of G is defined as a closure of maximal value
(i.e.
∑
vi∈Y ∗
ci is maximal).
Picard [1976] provides a combinatorial algorithm to find the optimal solution. It is done by reduc-
ing the problem to a network flow instance. First, he gives an equivalent quadratic formulation
of the constraints. Then, it turns out that the Lagrangian dual of this construction is essentially
the same task as finding the minimum cut of an associated network, which can be solved in
polynomial time by maximizing the flow on the related network.
Maximal closure problems are well studied by virtue of their connection to a wide range
of practical problems from open pit mining, record segmentation in large shared data bases to
portfolio selection under contingency constraints. For more examples see Faaland et al. [1990]
and Hochbaum and Chen [2000]. The latter papers also provide an overview and comparison of
network based algorithms and heuristics used in practice to deal with maximum closure problems.
As a summary of our discussion we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Finding the profit-maximizing, deterministic, ex-post individual rational and dom-
inant strategy implementable mechanism for the provision of a single, non-excludable public good
can be done in time polynomial in the number of agents and the number of possible type tuples
(|N |, |T |).
Gu¨th and Hellwig [1986] characterize the profit-maximizing Bayesian-Nash implementable mech-
anism for the case that types are distributed independently. The next subsection compares their
result to ours.
3.3 Independent type distributions
Suppose, that types are independently distributed, i.e., for all t ∈ T we have that ϕt =
∏
i
ϕti .
Readily, in this case for all t−i
µti|t−i = µti = ti − (t+i − ti)
(
1− Φti
ϕti
)
.
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This implies that we can express the coefficients of the objective function in terms of virtual
valuations in the Myerson sense for both settings:
bt = ϕt
(∑
i
µti − C
)
.
Observe that bt is non-negative if and only if the sum of virtual valuations at t covers the cost.
Moreover, assuming type distributions with monotone non-decreasing hazard rate
ϕti
1−Φti and types
where t+i = ti+1, the virtual valuations along with the sum of virtual valuations become monotone
non-decreasing in t. This implies that if there is a t such that bt ≥ 0, then for all s ≥ t we have
that bs ≥ 0. Hence, the optimal solution can be characterized as follows: set xt = 1 if and only
if
∑
i µti ≥ C. This coincides with the findings of Gu¨th and Hellwig [1986], which implies that
Bayesian-Nash implementation leads to the same optimal mechanism in case of independent type
distributions. We elaborate on this observation in further details in Section 4.1.
4 Other solution concepts
In Section 3 we showed how to find the optimal deterministic, ex-post individual rational, domi-
nant strategy implementable mechanism. Corollary 3.2 tells us that randomized algorithms cannot
do better than deterministic ones due to the TUM structure of the constraints, hence the first
requirement does not have an impact on the expected profit. In this section we investigate what
happens if we relax the remaining two requirements. First, we analyze Bayesian-Nash implemen-
tation as a less demanding alternative for dominant strategy implementation, then we focus on
the implications of interim individual rationality.
Definition 4.1 A mechanism, represented by its induced variables {xt}t∈T and {pit}i∈N,t∈T , is
Bayesian-Nash implementable if and only if for all i ∈ N and ti, si ∈ Ti we have that∑
t−i
ϕt−i|ti(tixti,t−i − piti,t−i) ≥
∑
t−i
ϕt−i|ti(tixsi,t−i − pisi,t−i). (4)
Definition 4.2 A mechanism, represented by its induced variables {xt}t∈T and {pit}i∈N,t∈T , is
interim individual rational if and only if for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti we have that∑
t−i
ϕt−i|ti(tixti,t−i − piti,t−i) ≥ 0. (5)
4.1 Bayesian-Nash implementation
Recent papers provide conditions under which Bayesian-Nash and dominant strategy implemen-
tation are equivalent for one-dimensional types that are distributed independently, and valuations
for outcomes that are linear functions of agents’ types. Gershkov et al. [2011] show that in case
of two outcomes for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there is a dominant-strategy
incentive compatible mechanism that generates the same interim probabilities with which each
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alternative is selected. The paper provides an example for a three outcome case where the equiv-
alence brakes down. A positive result for environments with more than two outcomes is given
in Manelli and Vincent [2010], who prove the equivalence for not necessarily symmetric, single-
item auction settings. If we define equivalence in a weaker sense, i.e, two implementations are
equivalent if they generate the same interim utilities for each agent, then according to Gershkov
et al. [2012] Bayesian-Nash and dominant strategy implementation remains equivalent in general
in environments with more than two outcomes. All these results require that the type space is
single-dimensional.
Corollary 4.3 In the profit-maximizing non-excludable public good problem where the types are
independently distributed we can restrict ourselves to dominant strategy implementation without
loss of generality.
Proof Observe that this problem is a special case of the setting discussed in Gershkov et al.
[2011] which implies that for every Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there is a dominant
strategy incentive compatible one that provides the same interim probabilities of providing the
public good. In this case we can construct transfers for the dominant strategy implementable
mechanism using the payments of the Bayesian mechanism in such a way that the expected
revenues of the two mechanisms are equal (see Gershkov et al. [2012]).
This result does not extend to the case of correlated type distributions as we can see from the
following example.
Example 4.4 Let N = {1, 2}, T1 = T2 = {1, 2}, C = 1 and ϕ1,1 = 0.4, ϕ1,2 = 0.1, ϕ2,1 = 0.1,
ϕ2,2 = 0.4. Solving this problem with our approach yields the optimal solution given in the
following table.
t xt p
1
t p
2
t
(1, 1) 0 0 0
(1, 2) 0 0 0
(2, 1) 0 0 0
(2, 2) 1 2 2
This mechanism yields an expected profit of 1.2, which is by definition the highest expected revenue
that any ex-post individual rational and dominant strategy implementable mechanism can attain
in this setting. Next, consider the following mechanism.
t xt p
1
t p
2
t
(1, 1) 1 1 1
(1, 2) 0 0 0
(2, 1) 0 0 0
(2, 2) 1 1.75 1.75
Notice that the allocation rule of this mechanism is not monotone, hence the mechanism is not
dominant strategy incentive compatible. Observe, on the other hand, that it is Bayesian incentive
compatible and its expected profit is 1.4.
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Thus, in case of correlated type distributions there can be Bayesian-Nash implementable mecha-
nisms for the non-excludable public good problem that generate higher revenue than any mecha-
nism implementable in dominant strategies.
4.2 Interim individual rationality
Interim individual rationality constraints can be modeled as Bayesian incentive compatibility
constraints with dummy types and the same can be done with ex-post individual rationality
and dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraints (see Vohra [2011] for further details).
Corollary 4.3 tells us that the optimal mechanisms yield the same revenue for both notions of
implementation when types are distributed independently. Hence we can conclude the following.
Corollary 4.5 In the profit-maximizing, non-excludable public good problem where the types are
independently distributed we can restrict ourselves to interim individual rationality without loss
of generality.
Example shows that in case of correlated types the equivalence of Bayesian-Nash and dominant
strategy implementation does not hold, hence we can as well expect that interim individual
rationality provides us more flexibility to elicit payments. An key result concerning the limitations
of ex-post individual rationality compared to interim individual rationality is due to Cre´mer and
McLean [1988]. They deal with single-item auction settings. Given a fixed type space, they
provides conditions on the joint distribution of these types that allow full extraction of the agents’
surplus by interim individual rational mechanisms which are either Bayesian-Nash or dominant
strategy implementable. When these conditions are met, full surplus extraction can be achieved
by a Vickrey auction with modified payments. To explain the conditions in our context, consider
an agent i and let Γi denote the Ti×T−i matrix whose elements are the conditional probabilities of
the joint distribution function, that is, Γiti,t−i = ϕt−i|ti . For dominant strategy implementation the
condition is that for each agent i the columns of Γi have to be linearly independent. For Bayesian
implementation the condition is milder: it requires only the conic independence of the columns
of Γi (i.e. no column is contained in the cone spanned by the other columns). For a mechanism
given by its induced variables {xt}t∈T and {pit}t∈T,i∈N , let us define the expected social surplus as∑
t ϕtxt(
∑
i ti − C). The expected profit of the public good provider is always less than or equal
to the expected social surplus due to (5). It is a folklore result that the expected social surplus is
maximized by mechanisms that allocate if and only if the sum of valuations exceed the cost (see,
for example, Nisan et al. [2007]). Therefore the expected surplus arising from such a mechanism
is an upper bound on the maximal expected profit that can be achieved for a given instance. If a
mechanism yields profit equal to this upper bound, we say that the mechanism extracts the full
social surplus.
Theorem 4.6 Take an instance of the profit-maximizing, non-excludable public good problem.
Assume that the type distribution satisfies the following: for each i ∈ N there does not exist a
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vector of {λti}ti∈Ti, not all equal to zero, such that∑
ti∈Ti
λtiϕt−i|ti = 0 ∀t−i ∈ T−i. (6)
Then the profit-maximizing, dominant strategy implementable and interim individual rational
mechanism can be constructed in time polynomial in |T | and |N |. Moreover, the optimal mecha-
nism is deterministic and extracts the full social surplus.
Theorem 4.7 Take an instance of the profit-maximizing, non-excludable public good problem.
Assume that the type distribution satisfies the following: for each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti there
does not exist a vector {λsi}si∈Ti\ti such that
λsi ≥ 0 ∀si ∈ Ti\ti (7)
and
ϕt−i|ti =
∑
si∈Ti\ti
λsiϕt−i|si ∀t−i ∈ T−i. (8)
Then the profit-maximizing, Bayesian-Nash implementable and interim individual rational mech-
anism can be constructed in time polynomial in |T | and |N |. Moreover, the optimal mechanism
is deterministic extracts the full social surplus.
The proofs for both Theorems are based on mild modifications of the construction given in Cre´mer
and McLean [1988] and the observation that these constructions can be done in polynomial time.
We provide them in the appendix.
We emphasize that determining whether a distribution satisfies the conditions of either The-
orem 4.6 or Theorem 4.7 can be done in polynomial time. The linear independence of the con-
ditional probability matrices can be done by Gaussian elimination, whilst the question of conic
independence can be reduced to a feasibility check of a series of linear programs (one program
per column).
In terms of surplus extraction, the assumptions in Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.7 are not
just sufficient, but also necessary in the following sense. Whenever a joint type distribution fails
condition (6) or (7) and (8) we can construct a T such that full surplus extraction is not possible
in the corresponding settings (a proof can be given by modifying the proof for auctions by Cre´mer
and McLean [1988], but is omitted here). Independent distributions violate the assumptions of
both theorems, which explains partly why we cannot achieve more revenue with interim individual
rationality than with ex-post individual rationality under such distributions.
We conclude this section with an example to show that the equivalence of ex-post and interim
individual rationality is no longer valid under correlated types.
Example 4.8 Consider the following mechanism for the setting in Example 4.2.
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t xt p
1
t p
2
t
(1, 1) 1 2/3 2/3
(1, 2) 1 213 2/3
(2, 1) 1 2/3 213
(2, 2) 1 213 2
1
3
Observe that the proposed mechanism is not ex-post individual rational, but dominant strategy
incentive compatible, interim individual rational and yields an expected profit of 2. Therefore it
extracts the whole social surplus, which is not possible when we require ex-post individual ratio-
nality. (Indeed, the second mechanism from Example 4.2 has been verified by a computer program
to be optimal.)
5 Conclusions
We have studied the problem of finding the optimal, deterministic, mechanism for providing a
non-excludable public good when valuations are correlated. We considered dominant strategy
as well as Bayesian Nash implementation, and ex-post as well as ex-interim individual rational
mechanism. The results and open questions can be summarized in the following overview of
requirements:
1. The optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individual rational mechanism
can be computed in polynomial time.
2. The optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-interim individual rational mecha-
nism can be computed in polynomial time if the conditions of Theorem 4.6 hold. Example
4.8 shows that it may yield strictly higher revenue than the optimal mechanism for re-
quirements as in (1). It remains an open problem how to efficiently compute the optimal
deterministic mechanism for general dependent distributions.
3. The computation of the optimal Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, ex-interim individual
rational mechanism remains an open problem. Example 4.2 shows that it may yield strictly
higher revenue than the optimal mechanism for requirements as in (1).
4. The optimal Bayesian Nash incentive compatible, ex-interim individual rational mechanism
can be computed in polynomial time if the conditions of Theorem 4.7 hold. It follows from
Cre´mer and McLean [1988] that the optimal mechanism can yield strictly higher profit than
the optimal mechanism for requirements as in (2). It remains an open problem how to effi-
ciently compute the optimal deterministic mechanism for general dependent distributions.
In each of the cases where we are able to show polynomial time solvability, randomized mechanisms
cannot yield more revenue than deterministic mechanisms.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We leave it to the reader to verify that the payments given in (1)
provide ex post individual rational, dominant strategy incentive compatible payments for the
allocation rule given by x.
Now let p be any incentive compatible, ex-post individual rational payments for x. Observe
that if xti,t−i = xsi,t−i , then changing the role of si and ti in inequality (DS) implies that p
i
ti,t−i =
pisi,t−i . This is called taxation principle.
Now let xti,t−i = 1. By (IR) we get pti,t−i ≤ ti. In combination with the observation this
yields
pti,t−i ≤ inf {si|f(si, s−i) = 1}
Finally, let xti,t−i = 0. By (IR) we get pti,t−i ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The “if” part follows from the fact that the theorem is a general-
ization of the monotonicity constraints.
To prove the “only if” part, take any t, s ∈ T such that s  t. Let I be the index set for
dimensions i where si > ti. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that s and t differs
in the first m dimensions, so I = {1, . . . ,m}. Consider the series of types (t0, . . . , tm), where
ti = (s1, s2, . . . , si, ti+1, . . . , tm, . . .). Clearly, t
0 = t and tm = s. For all i by assumption and
by the construction it holds that tij = t
i−1
j for j 6= iand tii > ti−1i . Monotonicity implies that
xti ≥ xti−1 , hence
xs = xtm ≥ xtn−1 ≥ . . . ≥ xt0 = xt.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. The efficient allocation rule given by xt = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈N ti ≥ C,
together with payments pit set according to (1) provide the pivotal mechanism introduced by
Clarke [1971]. We show how to modify the payments piti,t−i by adding terms g
i
t−i such that the
resulting mechanism is interim individual rational and extracts in expectation full surplus. Such a
modification does not harm dominant strategy incentive compatibility as the terms do not depend
on ti.
Introduce for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti
hiti =
∑
t−i
ϕt−i|ti(tixti,t−i − piti,t−i)
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to measure the expected utility of agent i when he possesses type ti. Condition (6) ensures that
Γi has full row rank, hence there exist vectors (git−i)t−i∈T−i such that for all ti ∈ Ti we have that∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|tig
i
t−i = h
i
ti .
Now modify payments p as follows: pˆiti,t−i = p
i
ti,t−i + g
i
t−i . By definition∑
t−i
ϕt−i|ti(tixti,t−i − pˆiti,t−i) = 0,
that is, expected utility of each agent is 0. Thus the expected profit of the mechanism designer
equals social surplus. By that it attains the upper bound on the maximal profit and the mechanism
is optimal. Observe that the pivotal allocation function can be constructed in constant time and
the payment can be determined also in polynomial time using Gaussian elimination for instance.
Proof of Theorem 4.7 As in the proof of Theorem 4.6 we choose the allocation function that
maximizes social surplus: xt = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈N ti ≥ C.
By the assumptions that none of the rows of the matrices Γi is contained in the cone spanned
by the other rows of the same matrix, we get from Farka’s Lemma that there exist for each i ∈ N
and ti ∈ Ti a vector (giti)t−i∈T−i such that:∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|tig
i
ti,t−i < 0
and ∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|sig
i
ti,t−i ≥ 0 ∀si 6= ti.
Let hit = g
i
t −
∑
t−i∈T−i ϕt−i|tig
i
ti,t−i for all t ∈ T . Then we have that∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|tih
i
ti,t−i = 0
and ∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|sih
i
ti,t−i > 0 ∀si 6= ti.
Now define payments as
pit =
∑
t−i
ϕt−i|titixti,t−i +Mh
i
t
for some large enough M . The construction of hit implies that
∑
t−i ϕt−i|ti(tixsi,t−i − pisi,t−i) = 0
if si = ti otherwise it is arbitrary negative, which ensures that the interim individual rationality
constraints (5) are binding and the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints (4) are satisfied.
We get also that the mechanism extracts full social surplus, hence it is optimal.
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We next discuss the running time of constructing the optimal mechanism. The allocation
function is given, thus it takes constant time to determine it. To calculate the payments, first, we
have to find the collection {git}t∈T , then set an appropriate M . The latter can be done in linear
time, e.g., take
M = max
i,ti
{
∑
t−i
ϕt−i|titixti,t−i}/mini,ti {
∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|tih
i
t−i}.
For finding appropriate {git}t∈T for each agent i and each ti ∈ T in polynomial time one can use
the following linear program.
min
∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|tig
i
ti,t−i
subject to ∑
t−i∈T−i
ϕt−i|sig
i
ti,t−i ≥ 0 ∀si 6= ti.
This completes the proof.
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